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Abstract 
Quantitative Risk Assessment is a powerful tool for evaluating the risk of industrial facilities and land use planning. Its use in 
Engineering Design requires a criterion to define the wellness of different designs. Current criteria are exhaustive and require big 
efforts to be applied. In the present work it is demonstrated that a simple criterion based on the surface enclosed in isorisk curves 
is useful for comparing the results of different QRA. Using such criterion, some existing radiation and overpressure threshold 
values producing domino effect in pressure tanks are compared. The Probit equations are used to model the domino effect. The 
method of surfaces enclosed in isorisk curves gives coherent results evaluating the risk associated to different layouts of a plant, 
opening the door of using QRA in the design of industrial facilities 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of scientific committee of Beijing Institute of Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1996, the European Union approved the Directive 96/82/CE[1] that modifies the first Directive 82/501/CEE [2] 
that regulates the major accidents involving dangerous substances caused by the industrial plants. This Directive, 
called Seveso II, had supposed a big challenge to reduce the risk of these accidents because it introduces aspects like 
the necessity of a correct use of the land, forcing Governments to dictate land use planning laws, and the evaluation 
of accidents propagation or what it is known as domino effect. 
In 1999, the Spanish Government adapted the Seveso II Directive into its Law, through the Real Decreto 
1254/1999[3]. In this, it were approved the measures to control the risk associated with plants and were stablished 
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the requirements that Autonomous Communities, like Catalonia, should define all the necessary to apply properly 
the Seveso II Directive. The Government of Catalonia approved its own law [4] in which were stablished the 
procedures and the measures to be taken in order to ensure the correct management and control of the risk of major 
accidents involving dangerous substances. One of these measures was the incorporation of the Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA) following other countries like, essentially, the Netherlands. 
After that decision, the Catalan Government invest a lot of effort to standardize the use of Quantitative Risk 
Assessment as a tool for knowing the real risk affecting the population and the installations close to the plants with 
dangerous substances. After some years of a teamwork involving people from the Administration, from the industrial 
plants, and from the consultants and independent evaluation bodies, it was published an operative procedure [5] for a 
common and correct application of QRA. 
After 18 years of existence of the Seveso II Directive and its application in all the European countries, a huge 
amount of studies appeared to assess all new considerations derived from the Directive. Domino effect is, probably, 
one of the points that attract more attention on these years since it involves not only deterministic phenomena but 
also many probabilistic aspects. Some of these studies can demonstrate that considering domino effect in 
Quantitative Risk Assessment it is achieved the prevention of major accidents or, at least, the mitigation of their 
damaging effects. 
The main objective of this presentation is to show how considering domino effect in QRA at earlier stages of the 
design is possible to achieve a layout of the plant with a minimum risk. In addition, a way to use as simplest models 
as possible will be considered. 
2. Domino Effect 
It is necessary to have a clear idea about what domino effect implies or even is, since there is not a unique 
definition in the research community. 
Cozzani et al. in 2005 [6] define a domino effect as accidental sequences having at least three common features:  
x  A primary accidental scenario, which initiates the domino accidental sequence. 
x  The propagation of the primary event, due to an escalation vector generated by the physical effect of the primary 
one and resulting in the damage of at least one secondary item. 
x  One or more secondary events (i.e. fires, explosions and toxic dispersions) involving the damaged equipment 
items. 
Reniers [7] classified domino effects into two categories: single-company domino effect and multi-company 
domino effect. The first one, also named internal, refers to the damage consequences of an escalation accident 
occurring inside the plant; in the second one, external, a primary event occurring inside the boundaries of the plant, 
affects a larger area causing secondary accidents outside.  
However, for many purposes the simplest definition proposed by Delvosalle in Reniers’ book[7] is enough. He 
said that a “domino effect is a cascade of accidents (domino events) in which the consequences of a previous 
accidents are increased by the following one(s), spatially as well as temporally, leading to a major accident.” 
Looking to the historical analysis reported by Darbra el al. [8], 225 accidents involving domino effects occurred 
from 1961 to 2007 and the most common setting were storage areas (35%). In addition, most of the accidents (89%) 
concerned flammable substances, especially LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) that represents the 26.7% of the sample. 
On the same way, Badger [9] from the NFPA (National Fire and Protection Association) reported that 13% of the 
major fire accidents occurred in the USA took place in storage installations and were capable to cause a loss of 
nearby $70 million. 
The recent book edited by Cozzani and Reniers [10] represents the most exhaustive collection of the state of the 
art models, concepts and theories about the influence of domino effect into industrial safety. 
Sempere, Nomen and Mariotti [11] present the existing problem for choosing the threshold limits to be used in 
QRA including domino effect. In our paper, four different values are compared: 
1) Established limits in a determined country (Spain) by its law. 
2) An approximation based on the Probit equations. 
3) Established limits from a previous study from Sempere and Nomen in 2002[12] as a consequence of Seveso 
2 directive. 
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4) Threshold values proposed by Antonioni et al. [13]. 
The use of different threshold values in order to perform the assessment of domino escalation is a simple and 
user-friendly manner. As explained by Tugnoli et al. [14] a threshold value can be considered as “the minimum 
value of a physical effect able to cause a damage to a target equipment”. 
1) As an example, Sempere and Nomen [12] consider the values used in Spain and defined in its law RD 
1196/2003[15]. These values are 8 kW·m-2 for thermal radiation and 160 mbar for overpressure. It looks that these 
values have an operative objective since they are defined for preventing possible domino effects over the 
neighborhood plants. It is obvious that this is one of the objectives of the safety reports to be elaborate by the 
industries to the Administration. These reports are used by the Administration for preparing the exterior emergency 
response plans and for protecting the population. 
2) Before the Spanish legislation published the above values, the Catalan Government commissioned a study 
to our group to determine which threshold values would be the most suitable for the domino effect to be considered 
in the safety reports. Our proposal was not nearly as conservative as the finally adopted by the Spanish government. 
In our study, the threshold domino effect of thermal radiation was placed around the 37 kW·m-2 and 160 mbar for 
overpressure, but can go up to 350 mbar in the case of pressure vessels. 
Obviously, using values as restrictive as those defined in the Spanish legislation bring to include in the QRA 
many more secondary events that those are credible. One of the most recognized works in this subject is the one 
done by Antonioni et al.[13] which offers new threshold limit values with a slightly different basis of the one used in 
our study. Table 1 presents a summary of the three sets of limits. 
Table 1 states that the effects of an explosion over an atmospheric tank give the only coincidence. In the other 
cases, the more conservative value is always that given by the Spanish law, confirming that these values are not 
defined with a view to perform a QRA. The other two sets of data give similar values for pressure tanks, but they 
differ when considering atmospheric tanks. 
 
Table 1. Threshold values for domino effect. (1): Antonioni et al.[13], (2): Sempere and Nomen[12]; (3): Spanish law[15] 
Primary 
accident 
Escalation vector Threshold Values 
Pressurized tank Atmospheric tank 
Consequence 
Flash fire Thermal radiation 
(kW·m-2) 
- - No consequence 
Fireball Thermal radiation 
(kW·m-2) 
- 
≥37     (2) 
≥8       (3) 
≥100   (1) 
≥37     (2) 
≥8       (3) 
Tank fire 
Jet fire Thermal radiation 
(kW·m-2) 
≥40     (1) 
≥37     (2) 
≥8       (3) 
≥10    (1) 
≥37     (2) 
≥8       (3) 
Jet fire, Pool fire, BLEVE, toxic 
release 
Pool fire Thermal radiation 
(kW·m-2) 
≥40     (1) 
≥37     (2) 
≥8       (3) 
≥10     (1) 
≥37     (2) 
≥8       (3) 
Jet fire, Pool fire, BLEVE, toxic 
release 
Explosion Overpressure (mbar) 
 
≥220   (1) 
≥350   (2) 
≥160   (3) 
≥160   (1) 
≥160   (2) 
≥160   (3) 
Tank fire, explosion 
 
In order to adjust the number of secondary events, the method based on the Probit equations proposed by Cozzani 
and Reniers[10] is included in this work. 
This methodology involves the use of specific Probit equations proposed by different authors and allows 
calculating an escalation probability through a specific probabilistic function taking into account the time to failure 
(ttf) of the equipment exposed to a certain accident. Once the ttfhas been evaluated using the correlations of Table 2, 
it is possible to estimate the vessel vulnerability in terms of Probit constant (Y), applying the following correlation: 
 
ܻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ ȉ ሺݐݐ݂ሻ 
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where time to failure is expressed in minutes and the constants a and b are depending on an escalation vector, the 
degree of exposure and the type of tank, as shown in Table 2. 
According the Purple Book [16], the relation between the probability of an effect, P, (in this case escalation 
probability) and the corresponding Probit, Y, is given by: 
ܲ ൌ Ͳǡͷ ȉ ቂͳ ൅ ݁ݎ݂ ቀܻെͷξʹ ቁቃ, where   ݁ݎ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ
ʹ
ξߨ ׬ ݁െݐ
ʹ݀ݐݔͲ  
Table 2. Probit equations to estimate tank vulnerability. ttf: Time to Failure (s); V: tank volume (m3); I: thermal radiation (kW·m-2) 
Ps: maximum peak static overpressure (Pa); Y: constant of Probit 
Type of tank Escalation vector Type of exposure Probit equation 
Atmospheric Thermal Radiation Fully engulfment ሺݐݐ݂ሻ ൌ െͳǤͳ͵ ȉ ݈݊ሺܫሻ െ ʹǤ͸͹ ȉ ͳͲെͷ ȉ ܸ ൅ ͻǤͻ 
ܻ ൌ ͳʹǤͷͶെ ͳǤͺͶ͹ ȉ ༌ሺݐݐ݂ሻ 
  Distant source radiation - 
 Overpressure - ܻ ൌ െͳͺǤͻ͸ ൅ ʹǤͶͶ ȉ ༌ሺ ܲݏሻ 
Pressurized Thermal radiation Fully engulfment ሺݐݐ݂ሻ ൌ െͳǤʹͻ ȉ ሺܫሻ൅ ͳͲǤͻ͹Ͳ ȉ ܸͲǤͲʹ͸  
ܻ ൌ ͳʹǤͷͶെ ͳǤͺͶ͹ ȉ ༌ሺݐݐ݂ሻ 
  Distant source radiation ሺݐݐ݂ሻ ൌ െͲǤͻͷ ȉ ሺܫሻ൅ ͺǤͺͶͷ ȉ ܸͲǤͲ͵ʹ  
ܻ ൌ ͳʹǤͷͶെ ͳǤͺͶ͹ ȉ ༌ሺݐݐ݂ሻ 
 Overpressure - ܻ ൌ െͶʹǤͶͶ ൅ ͶǤ͵͵ ȉ ༌ሺ ܲݏሻ 
3. QRA development 
Many authors developed the basic theory of Quantitative Risk Assessment. The methodology accepted in Europe 
today is that established at the Purple Book [16]and BEVI manual [17], both of Dutch origin. The methodology, 
collected by the Catalan Government [5] includes a preliminary stage of data collection and a selection of facilities 
and initiating events. Then, the procedure can be summarized as follows: 
1) Identification of primary events. 
2) Determination of the frequencies of the primary events. 
3) Determination of the probabilities of the accident scenarios. 
4) Determination of the impact distances of accident scenarios.  
5) Determination of individual risk. 
6) Determination of societal risk. 
7) Result analysis. 
8) Description of measures to reduce the risk. 
The objective of a QRA is to measure the increase in risk that produces an industrial activity and it is applied to 
the land use planning. Risk is measured in the form of individual or societal risk. The individual risk is the frequency 
with which a person without protection will die when placed all the time at a specific point on the map, due to an 
accident at the considered facility. Societal risk is the representation of the frequency with which the industrial 
activity will produce a number of deaths. This dissertation is only considering the individual risk, in order to make 
comparisons independent of the surroundings of the industrial plant. 
Taking into account that storage areas are the places mainly influenced by domino effects, most of the studies are 
related with domino effects, the present work focus its attention on them. 
The first step consist on identifying the decision variables, a criterion that is able to discriminate the different 
choices in order to suggest the most credible one. The variable chosen for this aim is the area wrapped by the isorisk 
curves, obtained, for the same layout, using two different approaches, based on Probit correlations and threshold 
values available in literature.  
Once the layout to investigate has been chosen, it is necessary to extract all the information about the facility in 
order to evaluate the consequences. 
The steps are the same as for a Quantitative Risk Assessment, according to the criteria stated by the Standard of 
Catalan Government [5]. 
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4. A case study 
Sempere, Nomen and Mariotti [11] apply the threshold values and the Probit equations to evaluate a case of LPG 
storage. The original installation consists of three cylindrical horizontal tanks of 95 m3 filled up to 85% and 
containing LPG at equilibrium pressure. They are provided with safety valves, which open at 20 bar. The main 
atmospheric characteristics at the plant location are reported in Table 3. It is assumed that probabilities for Pasquill’s 
classes D and F are equal. Fig. 1 shows the layout of the plant. 
 
      Table 3. Features of the plant. 
Variable Value units 
Temperature 15.3 oC 
Relative Humidity 71 % 
Pasquill’s stability D - 
F - 
Wind speed D 5.09 m·s-1 
Wind speed F 1.31 m·s-1 
Atmosferic Pressure 1017 mbar 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Detail of the original installation. 
  
The loss of containment (LOC) events associated to each tank are listed in Table 4, with their frequencies, as 
suggested by BEVI manual [17].  
 
         Table 4. LOCs and respective frequency, for each tank. 
LOC Description Frequency (yr-1) 
G1 Instantaneous release of the complete inventory ͷ ȉ ͳͲെ͹ 
G2 Continuous release of the complete inventory  in 10 min at a constant 
rate of release 
 
ͷ ȉ ͳͲെ͹ 
G2 Continuous release from a hole with effective diameter of 10 mm ͳ ȉ ͳͲെͷ 
 
LOC associated to piping and pumps are not considered in this study. Figures 2 and 3 show the event trees 
corresponding to the evolution of LOC of Table 4. 
The consequences of each final accident are calculated through EFFECTS and ALOHA, modeling LPG as 
propane. 
The method allows choosing a tank for the initial release and a primary accident, which can produce, or not, a 
domino escalation. The possible occurrence of this phenomenon is evaluated comparing the consequences of the 
initial accident with the values suggested by Cozzani and Reniers [10], in order to estimate the effects on vulnerable 
elements considering also, in case of domino propagation,  the damage to other tanks. Subsequently, if domino 
effect can occur, the vulnerabilities of secondary items are evaluated, in terms of times to failure, applying the 
correlations of Table 2, depending on the thermal radiation and overpressure profiles of the triggered tank, as 
proposed elsewhere by Landucci et al. [18]. The time to failure is considered the time at which the struck item can 
fail provoking the instantaneous release of the complete inventory, causing secondary scenarios that can carry on the 
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
28   Rosa Nomen et al. /  Procedia Engineering  84 ( 2014 )  23 – 32 
domino propagation to the items not affected yet.  These secondary accidents are studied in terms of new 
frequencies and consequences, once again referring to vulnerable elements or other items. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Event tree for an instantaneous release of pressurized liquefied flammable gas. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Event tree for a continuous release of pressurized liquefied flammable gas. 
P1=0.2 refers to LOC G3; P1=0.5 refers to LOC G2 
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Once all the tanks have been affected and all accidents have been studied, another initial scenario is considered, 
repeating the cycle explained above. When all initial accidents have been evaluated for all tanks, the algorithm ends 
with the total risk calculation by adding all the risk values stored during the procedure. 
5. Effect of the threshold values 
The use of the different threshold values or the Probit equations exposed above to the study case gives different 
results as shown in Fig. 4. 
As expected, the three sets of threshold values led to very different results, specially the value corresponding to 
the Spanish law. Distances to the 10-6 y-1 isorisk curves given by the threshold values proposed by Antonioni et al. 
[13] and Sempere and Nomen [12] are quite similar and smaller to those using the values of Antonioni et al.[13]. 
Probit equations produce intermediate results, but near to the two preceding threshold values. Discarding the value 
corresponding to the Spanish law, values obtained using Probit equations appear to be quite realistic and a little 
conservative. Taking into consideration that the calculation effort involved in using Probit equations is relatively 
small, we decided to use them in most of the works done in our group. 
 
Fig. 4. Results of the 10-6 y-1 isorisk curves using different threshold values for the evaluation of the domino effect. 
IQS states for Sempere and Nomen [12] 
 
Another point of view to analyze the results is considering the surface enclosed inside the 10-6 y-1 isorisk curve. 
Our group is using this concept – especially useful for irregular isorisk curves - to sort all the accident scenarios of a 
QRA according to their relevance, establishing urgencies in implanting prevention and/or protection measures. Fig. 
5 shows the equivalent results of the Fig. 4, but considering areas. 
6. QRA and layout 
When the goal of a QRA is not only the land use planning but also to improve the design of the installation, risk 
must be defined in terms of cost, directly or indirectly. This means, to define an objective function - the cost - which 
varies as a result of a series of design variables - decision variables -. 
In this sense, Bernechea and Arnaldos[19] demonstrate that performing QRA including domino effect at earlier 
stages and applying optimization techniques, considering both cost and risk, can allow the design of a storage area 
with a maximum reduction of the total risk. The authors apply their method to optimize the layout of a large storage 
of LPG. They determine successfully the optimal number of tanks for a total capacity and their best allocation. 
However, the algorithm developed by the authors uses different decision variables as input, such as number and 
type of tanks, distance between the items, layout of the installation, substances involved, frequencies of accidents etc. 
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and returns as output the risk associated to the facility, implementing the procedure of conventional QRA with a 
domino effect model. 
 
Fig. 5. Results of the areas enclosed by 10-6 y-1 isorisk curves using different threshold values for the evaluation of the domino effect. 
IQS states for Sempere and Nomen [12] 
 
In addition, such algorithm operates on several objective functions as cost of the facility, environmental cost, 
loses of production, image cost, etc. One of the most difficult issues of the model is assigning a real or imaginary 
cost to human life. Therefore, a multiobjective optimization procedure is required. Few procedures of this type are 
available, very few are efficient and all of them are very time consuming and require highly specialized 
professionals. 
What should be stressed from the work of Bernechea and Arnaldos [19] it is the important result found out: even 
if an accident has significant consequences but a low frequency of occurrence, it will have less impact on the final 
risk than another accident with lesser consequences but high rate of occurrence. Consequently, as more units are 
built, greater is the risk associated to the installation. 
In order to simplify the evaluation procedure, our group applied the analysis by surfaces enclosed in isorisk 
curves as a criterion for grading different designs of the layout of a facility. This criterion might be considered 
equivalent to the above exhaustive cost calculation because (a) the cost of equipment of different layouts may be 
approximately equivalent and (b) the covered surface is proportional to the magnitude of damages originated by an 
accident. 
Sempere et al. (2014) apply the surface criterion to the exposed study case, considering four different layouts: 
1) Original layout of three parallel tanks (Figure 1). 
2) Configuration 1, corresponding to one tank with the same total capacity.  
3) Configuration 2, corresponding to two tanks with the same total capacity. 
4) Configuration 3, corresponding to three tanks with the same total capacity in triangular distribution at the 
minimum distance which avoid domino effect (Figure 6). 
The results are displayed in Figures 7 and 8. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Determination of the minimum distance to avoid domino effect. 
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Fig. 7. Results of the 10-6 y-1 isorisk curves for different layouts 
 
 
Fig. 8. Results of the areas enclosed by 10-6 y-1 isorisk curves for different layouts 
 
According to the observation of Bernechea and Arnaldos [19], the best situation corresponds – surprisingly – to 
having one large tank of the total capacity. It has the biggest consequences, but they are compensated by lower 
frequencies and the absence of domino effect. 
Having three tanks instead of two does not give a real advantage, being quite equivalent. In this case, the changes 
in damages are approximately compensated by changes in frequencies. In Configuration 3 the reduction of the risk 
due to avoiding domino effect is compensated by the major affected surface occupied by the tanks. 
7. Conclusions 
A simple criterion based on the surface enclosed in isorisk curves is useful for comparing the results of different 
QRA. 
Using such criterion, the radiation and overpressure values producing domino effect in pressure tanks are 
compared. The threshold value data set proposed by the Spanish law is too much conservative. The data sets 
proposed by Antonioni et al. [13] and Sempere and Nomen [12] give approximately equivalent results. 
The Probit equations proposed by Cozzani et al. [6] give a little more conservative results than the data sets 
proposed by Antonioni et al. [13] and Sempere and Nomen [12].  
The method of surfaces enclosed in isorisk curves gives coherent results evaluating the risk associated to 
different layouts of a plant, opening the door of using QRA in the design of industrial facilities. 
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